Torts by Crawford, William E. & Shelby, David J., II
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 53 | Number 3
Review of Recent Developments: 1991-1992
January 1993
Torts
William E. Crawford
Louisiana State University Law Center
David J. Shelby II
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
William E. Crawford and David J. Shelby II, Torts, 53 La. L. Rev. (1993)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol53/iss3/15
Torts
William E. Crawford*
David J. Shelby, II**
I. TimE-FRAmE TORTS
Recent cases at the state and federal level have opened the door
for actions by persons who have developed cancer from smoking cig-
arettes or who have developed the lung disease commonly known as
asbestosis. In some cases the lung condition is attributed to both asbestos
and tobacco acting synergistically.
The first decision of importance is the recent United States Supreme
Court decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.' Cipollone is based
on constitutional law, and more specifically the extent that a federal
statute, which mandates warnings on cigarette labels and in advertise-
ments, preempts state law actions for damages.
The plaintiff in Cipollone filed a complaint in federal district court
relying on diversity jurisdiction and alleging that she had developed lung
cancer from smoking cigarettes produced and sold by the defendant
manufacturers. Her claims were based on New Jersey law as follows:
(1) defective design because the manufacturer failed to use a
safer alternative design;
(2) defective design because the social value of the product was
outweighed by the dangers it created;
(3) failure to provide adequate warnings of the health conse-
quences associated with smoking cigarettes;
(4) negligence in the manner the cigarettes were tested, re-
searched, sold, promoted, and advertised;
(5) breach of express warranty that cigarettes did not present
any significant health consequences;
(6) fraudulent misrepresentation in that the manufacturers will-
fully attempted to neutralize the federally mandated warnings;
(7) fraudulent misrepresentation in that the manufacturers pos-
sessed and failed to act upon medical and scientific data which
indicated that cigarettes presented health hazards; and
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(8) conspiracy to defraud by depriving the public of such medical
scientific data.
A. Preemption
The Supreme Court considered the question of whether the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 19652 or the 1969 amendment
to that Act3 preempts any or all of plaintiff's claims. The Court held
that the Act of 1965 does not preempt state law claims for damages,
i.e., the 1965 Act only supersedes positive legislative enactments which
mandate particular warnings in advertising and on labels. Section 4 of
the Act contains the federally mandated warning and Section 5 of the
Act contains the following statement of preemption:
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the
statement required by section 4 of this Act, shall be required
on any cigarette package. (b) No statement relating to smoking
and health shall be required in the advertising of any cigarettes
the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the pro-
visions of this act.
In 1969, section 5(b) of the Act was amended to read as follows:
(b) No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health
shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising
or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled
in conformity with the provisions of this act.
The Court reasoned that by amending the preemptive section of the
Act Congress intended not only to reach positive legislative enactments
but also any type of duty imposed under state law, including common
law tort duties.
In order to determine which of plaintiff's claims were preempted,
the Court looked to the exact language of the Act: whether the predicate
legal duty to a claim for damages would constitute a requirement or
prohibition based on smoking and health with respect to advertising or
pronlotion. 4
The Court concluded that plaintiff's claim that the defendant failed
to provide adequate warning was preempted to the extent that plaintiff
was trying to show that post-1969 labels, advertisements, and promotions
should have included additional warnings. The Court also concluded
2. Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340
(1988)).
3. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87
(1970) (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1988)).
4. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2612.
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that negligence claims based on the research and testing practices of the
defendants were not preempted because such a duty would not be "with
respect to ... advertising or promotion." ' Plaintiff's claim for breach
of express warranty was not preempted even though plaintiff claimed
that the warranty arose out of statements made in advertising. The Court
reasoned that an express warranty was not a duty imposed by law but
a "contractual commitment voluntarily undertaken" by the defendants.6
With regard to plaintiff's fraudulent misrepresentation claims the
Court reached a different conclusion for each. The first claim, that
defendants neutralized the effect of the federally mandated warnings,
was preempted. The Court reasoned that a state law duty not to minimize
the hazards of smoking was no more than the converse of a duty to
include warnings, a basis for claim that the Court had already determined
to be preempted.
The second fraudulent misrepresentation claim was not preempted.
The Court reasoned that a duty not to make false representations of
material facts or not to conceal material facts was not necessarily related
to advertising or promotion "insofar as those claims rely on a state
law duty to disclose such facts through channels of communication other
than advertising or promotion." ' 7 The Court also reasoned that claims
based on a state law duty not to make false statements of material facts
in advertising are not preempted because such claims are not predicated
on a duty based on smoking and health but rather on a more general
duty not to deceive.'
Lastly the Court concluded that plaintiff's claims alleging conspiracy
to misrepresent or conceal material facts were not preempted because
they were based on a general duty not to conspire to commit fraud-
not a prohibition "based on smoking and health." In Cipollone, the
defendants did not assert that plaintiff's claims based on defective design
were preempted by the 1969 version of the federal statute. However,
similar defective design claims were asserted in a Louisiana case prior
to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Cipollone.
B. Louisiana Law
On the local scene, prior to the Cipollone decision, in Gilboy v.
American Tobacco Co.,' the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the
Louisiana Products Liability Act, 0 effective September 1, 1988, could
5. Id. at 2621.
6. Id. at 2622.
7. Id. at 2623.
8. Id. at 2624.
9. 582 So. 2d 1263 (La. 1991).
10. La. R.S. 9:2800.51-.59 (1991).
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not be applied retroactively. The plaintiff filed suit prior to the effective
date of the Act; therefore, he had the right to proceed under pre-
Products Liability Act law, as set forth in Halphen v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp." The court in Gilboy concluded that under Halphen the
plaintiff had the right to have a jury determine whether cigarettes are
unreasonably dangerous per se, overturning the court of appeal's granting
of summary judgment for the defendant.
The Gilboy court went on to conclude that an unreasonably dan-
gerous per se claim under Haiphen was not preempted by the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act.' 2 Even if the Federal Labeling
Act preempts a failure to warn claim, a plaintiff still has an unreasonably
dangerous per se claim. Although the Louisiana decision was rendered
prior to the United States Supreme Court decision in Cipollone, it
appears to have anticipated the crux of the decision very accurately.
Under Halphen, to determine if a product is "unreasonably dan-
gerous per se," the trier of fact must apply a risk/utility test, i.e.,
whether a reasonable person would conclude that the danger-in-fact,
whether foreseeable or not, outweighs the utility of the product. In
Gilboy, the court stated that "[wiarning consumers that a product is
dangerous reduces but does not eliminate a manufacturer's responsibility
for a product which is unreasonably dangerous per se."' 3 And "[tihe
adequacy of a manufacturer's warnings is a factor in assessing com-
parative fault.' '14
In Gilboy the court left open the following questions to be decided
as a matter of comparative fault: (1) Did the manufacturers suppress
health warnings? (2) How effective were the warnings? (3) Was the
plaintiff competent to assume the risk when he started smoking? (4)
Did plaintiff's addiction to cigarettes make his decision to continue
smoking a voluntary choice?, and (5) Did plaintiff voluntarily encounter
the risk of lung cancer? The court assumed that comparative fault would
be applicable without discussing the issue.
After Gilboy, the Halphen unreasonably dangerous per se claim
becomes a formidable weapon against cigarette manufacturers due to
the low social utility of cigarettes. Dates are an important concern to
potential plaintiffs attempting to assert Halphen claims. In Gilboy, suit
was filed prior to the effective date of the Product Liability Act;
therefore, all the key dates would have fallen prior to the effective date
of the Act. Key dates to consider are (1) when plaintiff started smoking,
(2) when plaintiff developed cancer, and (3) when plaintiff became aware
that he or she had developed cancer. The date that will determine whether
11. 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986).
12. Gilboy, 582 So. 2d at 1266.
13. Id. at 1265.
14. Id.
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pre-Act law will be applied is the date that plaintiff's cause of action
accrues. Plaintiff's cause of action accrues when he has a right to
sue-after the three elements of fault, causation, and damage have
occurred. 1 6
For prescriptive purposes, plaintiff has one year to file suit from
the time that he has a cause of action, which would be one year from
the date he develops cancer.' In order to use pre-Act law, plaintiff
would have to invoke contra non valentem to avoid dismissal based on
prescription. Contra non valentem is an exception to prescription "where
in fact and for good cause plaintiff is unable to exercise his cause of
action when it accrues."'" The two categories of the doctrine that could
be of benefit to a potential plaintiff suing a cigarette manufacturer are
(1) where the manufacturer himself has done something to effectively
prevent the potential plaintiff from availing himself of his cause of
action and (2) where the cause of action is not known or reasonably
knowable by the plaintiff, even though his ignorance is not induced by
the manufacturer. 9
The next issue a potential plaintiff must consider is comparative
fault. Whether comparative fault will be applied to a plaintiff's claims
against a cigarette manufacturer will depend on whether plaintiff's claims
are based on negligence or strict product liability. In 1979 the legislature
amended Civil Code article 2323 to codify the concept of comparative
fault. The act that amended Article 2323 included the statement that
"[t]he provisions of this act shall not apply to claims arising from events
that occurred prior to the time this act becomes effective." 20 It is clear
that the legislature intended Article 2323 to apply prospectively only
from the effective date of August 1, 1980,21 but a jurisprudential scheme
of comparative fault analogous to Article 2323 was extended to product
liability claims through Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast.22 Because the comparative
fault scheme applicable to product liability was jurisprudentially created
through Bell it could be applied retroactively even though Article 2323
15. See Cole v. Celotex, 599 So. 2d 1058 (La. 1992); Crier v. Whitecloud, 496 So.
2d 305 (La. 1986); Faucheaux v. Alton Ochsner Medical Found. Hosp. & Clinic, 470 So.
2d 878 (La. 1985); and Lott v. Haley, 370 So. 2d 521 (La. 1979).
16. See Cole, 599 So. 2d 1058; Trahan v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 314 So. 2d 350
(La. 1975); Owens v. Martin, 449 So. 2d 448 (La. 1984) (citing Seals v. Morris, 410 So.
2d 715 (La. 1982)); and Weiland v. King, 281 So. 2d 688 (La. 1973).
17. La. Civ. Code art. 3492.
18. Corsey v. State Dep't of Corrections, 375 So. 2d 1319, 1321 (La. 1979).
19. Id.
20. 1979 La. Acts No. 431, § 4.
21. 1979 La. Acts No. 431, § 7; see Cole v. Celotex, 599 So. 2d 1058, 1065 (La.
1992).
22. 462 So. 2d 166 (La. 1985).
19931 1015
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
could not.23 In applying comparative fault retroactively to a product
liability claim that accrued prior to the effective date of Article 2323,
the court would be applying the comparative fault rule of Bell retro-
actively and not that of Article 2323 because Article 2323 does not
apply directly to product liability claims. Substantively, Bell makes it
clear that contributory negligence and assumption of risk are inconsistent
with a comparative fault system and should not operate as a complete
bar to recovery.
In Fulgium v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc.,24 a federal district
court assumed that comparative fault should be applied to an asbestos
exposure case in which the exposure occurred prior to the effective date
of Article 2323. The court cited Bell to support the idea that Louisiana
"rejected contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery in all
product liability cases." ' 25 The court went on to apply the Bell test and
determined that comparative fault would be appropriate in that particular
case.
In Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc.,2 the Louisiana Supreme Court
decided that assumption of the risk should not operate as a complete
bar to plaintiff's recovery regardless of whether the defendant is found
to be negligent or strictly liable. Just as the Bell court found with
contributory negligence, the Murray court concluded that assumption of
the risk was inconsistent with a comparative fault system. "Regardless
of the theory upon which liability is based, it appears evident that the
application of comparative fault precepts in the multitude of cases
affected by this decision necessarily eliminates the efficacy of 'assumption
of risk' and, apparently negates the need to speak in term of 'victim
fault. ' 27
Under pre-Act product liability law, a plaintiff may also bring a
claim against a manufacturer in negligence, while under post-Act product
liability law the Act is the exclusive remedy for a plaintiff suing a
manufacturer for damage caused by his product. As discussed earlier,
Article 2323 applies directly to negligence claims, and if plaintiff is suing
based on "events" which occurred prior to the effective date of Article
2323 in its present form then plaintiff is subject to pre-comparative fault
law under which contributory negligence and assumption of the risk
operate as complete bars to recovery. The recent Louisiana Supreme
Court decision in Cole v. Celotex makes it clear that in a negligence
action "events" that occurred prior to August 1, 1980, are subject to
pre-comparative law. 21
23. See Norton v. Crescent City Ice Mfg. Co., 150 So. 855 (La. 1933).
24. 645 F. Supp. 761 (W.D. La. 1986).
25. Id. at 762.
26. 521 So. 2d 1123 (La 1988).
27. Id. at 1137 (Cole, J., assigning additional reasons).
28. Cole v. Celotex, 599 So. 2d 1058 (La. 1992).
1016 [Vol. 53
TORTS
In Cole, plaintiffs sued the executive officers and their employer
corporation in negligence for failing to provide a safe workplace. Plain-
tiffs developed cancer from asbestos exposure. The court held that the
key "event" to determine whether pre-comparative fault law applied
was the date of exposure. The court reasoned that in the-atypical situation
where the damages or injuries result from a continuous process-a slow
development of a hidden disease over time-the proper "event" for
fixing the effective date for application of Article 2323 is the tortious
exposure to asbestos rather than the date on which the cause of action
accrues. Since the tortious exposures in Cole occurred prior to August
1, 1980, the court applied pre-comparative fault law. However, the jury
specifically found that plaintiffs were not contributorily negligent; there-
fore, contributory negligence did not operate as a bar to recovery in
the case. Pre-comparative virile share apportionment of liability was used
to allocate liability among the solidarily liable tortfeasors because.Civil
Code article 1804, governing contribution among tortfeasors, had the
same effective date as Article 2323, having been revised in the same
legislative Act .29
In Cole, the court did not address whether comparative fault prin-
ciples should be applied to plaintiffs' product liability claims against
the asbestos manufacturers. The court recognized that this would depend
upon an application of Bell:
As noted by the Third Circuit, contributory negligence was
available as a defense to the only defendant in this case, INA,
the liability insurer of the executive officers. Several manufac-
turers and suppliers remain as defendants in the companion
'1 Champagne case. Whether contributory negligence or compar-
ative fault is available as a defense to those defendants in the
product liability claims asserted against them is an issue not
presented or decided in the present case. See Bell v. Jet Wheel
Blast, Division of Ervin Industries, 462 So.2d 166 (La. 1985).30
Champagne v. Celotex Corp.3 was the companion case to Cole.
The manufacturers in Champagne were the principal defendants, and
the court held, as it did in Cole, that pre-comparative fault law should
be applied to plaintiffs' claims in negligence against their employer and
co-employees for failing to provide a safe workplace. The Champagne
case had not yet gone to a jury, so the questions of plaintiff fault or
contributory negligence had not yet been determined. The court held
that a finding of contributory negligence or assumption of the risk would
bar plaintiffs' recovery in their negligence claims against their employers
29. Civil Code article 2103 was revised in the same legislative act. This article was
one of the sources of Article 1804. 1979 La. Acts. No. 331, § 1.
30. Cole, 599 So. 2d at 1068 n.29.
31. 599 So. 2d 1086 (La. 1992).
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and co-employees, but the court did not address whether comparative
fault should be applied to plaintiffs' product liability claims against the
asbestos manufacturers.
Justice Dennis, concurring in the Champagne decision, recognized
that "the question whether contributory negligence or comparative fault
can be applied, as a matter of law, to reduce the recovery of the
plaintiffs from the manufacturers-defendants '3 2 was presented because
there had not yet been a jury determination, as there had been in Cole,
that plaintiffs were not contributorily negligent. Dennis correctly cites
Bell for the proposition that comparative fault, rather than contributory
negligence, applies to strict product liability claims. He applied com-
parative fault to this particular asbestos exposure case restating the Bell
test: "comparative fault may not be applied to reduce a claim for
damages in a case in which such a reduction would provide no. incentive
to other plaintiffs to guard against the type of negligent behavior engaged
in by the plaintiff."33 Dennis also noted that "the allocation of fault
among tortfeasors is founded in part on the need for economic incentive
for product quality control, a goal not advanced by forcing the injured
person to underwrite the loss, particularly when the defendant tortfeasors
have the capacity to distribute the loss more efficiently." '3 4 Whether
comparative fault will be applied to a pre-Act product liability claim
against a cigarette manufacturer will depend on a judicial application
of the Bell test.
It should also be observed that the claims in Cole and Champagne
are pre-Article 2324, which has been held not retroactive, so that all
defendants cast will be in full solidarity, not subject to an allocated
portion or percentage of fault. 0
Returning to the opening theme of this analysis, it appears that the
principles announced by the court in Cole and Champagne are generally
applicable to tobacco and lung cancer, determining whether to apply
pre-Product Act law and pre-comparative fault law, the accrual of the
cause of action, the application of contra non valentem, and the ap-
plicable rules of solidarity.
II. LOUISIANA's DOUBLE WHAMMY:35 THE DUTY-RISK ANALYSIS AND
THE LACK OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CIVIL TRIAL BY JURY
Roberts v. Benoit36 is the Louisiana Supreme Court's latest attempt
to articulate a workable approach to proximate or legal -cause, known
32. Id. at 1089 (Dennis, J., concurring).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Whammy is defined as "a paralyzing or lethal blow," Webster's Third New
International Dictionary 2599 (1986).
36. 603 So. 2d 150 (La. 1992).
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in Louisiana as the duty-risk analysis. 7 While Roberts is an excellent
work of scholarship, it does little to solve this long-standing puzzle.
The approach taken in Roberts is inconsistent with the court's 1988
decision in Pitre v. Opelousas General Hospital.38 The court's conversion
of a proximate cause issue into a scope-of-duty legal question necessarily
entailed exactly what the Pitre court sought to avoid and discourage-
a policy decision with no explanation. The Pitre court observed that
"terms such as 'duty' are merely verbal expressions of policy decisions
and do not explain them. Allusions to policy should not be made a
substitute for more determinate legal principles when they may be util-
ized." 3 9 This is particularly true when the basic issue is a factual prox-
imate cause question.
The court in Roberts held that the duty imposed on a sheriff not
to promote a cook to the position of deputy in name only, so that the
cook could receive state supplemental pay, did not include the risk that
the cook on his own time while intoxicated would accidentally shoot
the plaintiff with the cook's own personal firearm. The sheriff had
commissioned the cook and other kitchen workers as deputies so that
they could receive state supplemental pay. They were given inadequate
training which included only one day of firearms training. The trial
court found that the Sheriff's Office had negligently hired and trained
the cook/deputy; the Supreme Court reversed. The primary issue ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court was whether the acts of the Sheriff's
Office were the legal cause of the plaintiff's damages.
The opinion gives a scholarly and exhaustive discourse on legal
cause, citing the important cases on this issue, but offers no analysis
beyond what has already been developed in earlier opinions tackling the
question. The duty of care owed by the sheriff was defined in such
narrow terms as to preclude the possibility that the risk of plaintiff's
injury would fall within this duty, i.e., the Sheriff's Office had a duty
not to promote a kitchen worker to deputy so that he could receive
state supplementary pay, but this duty does not protect the public from
negligent acts of the "paper deputies" outside their work as kitchen
workers.
The cook was commissioned as a "deputy" in name only in that
he was never called upon to perform any duties other than those of a
cook. He was not required to carry a gun nor was he issued one. The
gun involved in the accident was purchased by the cook after he was
37. See Dixie Drive It Yourself Sys. v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471, 137
So. 2d 298 (1962); Hill v. Lundin & Assocs., Inc., 260 La. 542, 256 So. 2d 620 (1972);
Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1988).
38. 530 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1988).
39. Id. at 1155-56.
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commissioned as a deputy; however, the purchase was not linked to his
duties with the Sheriff's Office. The cook was clearly not qualified to
be commissioned as a deputy nor was he adequately trained. However,
during his limited training he was told that it was better to have a gun
and not to need it than to need a gun and not to have it. He was also
given a copy of department regulations which state that firearms should
be removed to a safe place while deputies are engaged in recreational
activities involving the consumption of alcohol and that a weapon should
only be drawn when one's life is in danger or the use of deadly force
is anticipated.
Whether the court reached the correct substantive result as to liability
in Roberts is of course open to question, particularly in view of the
vigorous dissents. The more troublesome aspect of the decision, however,
is that the court's treatment of the basic issue of proximate cause as
a scope-of-duty-law-question led it to make a policy decision without
discussion of the various influential policy factors. This approach is
inconsistent with the approach to legal cause taken a few years earlier
in Pitre, when the court adopted a foresight-foreseeability approach and
phrased it in the form of a question that should be decided by the trier
of fact, i.e., a negligent tortfeasor should be held liable for the damages
that were reasonably foreseeable at the time of the tortfeasor's conduct;
or, a negligent tortfeasor should be held liable only for the consequences
that a reasonable person would expect to follow from his conduct. 40
This issue of foreseeability is to be decided by the trier-of-fact, be it
judge or jury, in the form of the factual question of legal cause or
proximate cause, according to Pitre.
In the Pitre case, the court held that a physician who had negligently
performed a bilateral tubal ligation was liable only for the birth of the
unwanted and unplanned child, but he was not responsible for the risk
that the child would be born with a birth defect, for the physician could
not have predicted or foreseen that the child would be born with a
defect, nor did his negligence cause or create the defect.
The foresight-foreseeability approach of the Pitre court was taken
with the express intention of providing the trier of fact with a workable
system for making a determination of legal cause as a factual issue:
[I]t may be helpful to use a "legal cause" analysis which affords
the application of "foreseeability" rules and other concepts of
limitation. Although indistinct, these rules and concepts are more
determinate than the abstract idea of a "duty" based on various
"policy considerations" and may prove more helpful to triers
of the facts, at least as starting points for legal reasoning. 41
40. Id. at 1161.
41. Id. at 1156.
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The Pitre court clearly recognized the need to develop guidelines for
the trier of fact to follow:
Rather than merely deciding that the defendant's duty does or
does not cover certain types of damage after reflecting on ap-
propriate policy considerations, we will not only engage fully in
that judicial process but we will also attempt to articulate aux-
iliary rules for determining the extent and nature of damages
ascribable to the defendant that will be helpful to triers of fact
in future cases.42
Legal cause is correctly viewed by the Pitre court as a mixed question
of law and fact. Unless the court finds as a matter of law that there
is, or is not, legal cause, the question should go to the trier of fact.
By contrast the Roberts court took a straight duty/risk approach,
treating legal cause as purely a question of law for the court to decide,
on the theory that "the scope of the duty inquiry is ultimately a question
of policy" and thus a question of law for the court. The court did not
discuss the policy considerations that led to its conclusion. The court
resorted to a narrow statement of the duty in order to dispose of the
case consistently with its policy viewpoint, in a sense stacking the deck
of analysis to fit the result to the conscience-of-the-court feeling about
the case. The foreseeability approach was shrugged off as "merely a
legal fiction useful in instructing juries" which is "necessary if judges
are to palm off the theretofore legal question of legal cause as a factual
one to be decided by juries." ' 43 According to Roberts, the critical test
in Louisiana is phrased in terms of "ease of association" which is a
combination of both policy and foreseeability." More specifically, is the
harm to the plaintiff easily associated with the type of conduct engaged
in by the defendant?
It is widely acknowledged that the terms such as foreseeability,
reasonably anticipated, remote, and tenuous, when used by the appellate
court in disposing of a case, simply articulate conclusions already reached
by the court. Can "ease of association" be any different?4'
42. Id. at 1159.
43. This, notwithstanding the specific provision for legal cause as a jury issue as
provided by La. Code Civ. P. art. 1812.
44. Hill v. Lundin, 260 La. 542, 256 So. 2d 620 (1972).
45. Another court has stated:
On the previous appeal we stated aptly: "somewhere a point will be reached
when courts will agree that the link has become too tenuous-that what is
claimed to be consequence is only fortuity." We believe that this point has
been reached with [these] claims .... The instant claims occurred only because
the downed bridge made it impossible to move traffic along the river. Under
all the circumstances of this case, we hold that the connection between the
1993l
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An attempt was made in Roberts to reconcile the court's approach
with Pitre by suggesting that the approach taken in Pitre was helpful
only after the court had determined that the defendant had breached a
duty owed to plaintiff and was then trying to determine what damage
should be attributed to defendant's conduct. The Roberts court misses
defendants' negligence and the claimants' damages is too tenuous and remote
to permit recovery. "The law does not spread its protection so far." Holmes,
J., in Robins Dry Dock [& Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 at 309, 48 S.
Ct. 134 at 135 (1927)).
In the final analysis the circumlocution whether posed in terms of "fo-
reseeability," "duty," "proximate cause," "remoteness," etc. seems unavoid-
able. . . . [W]e return to Judge Andrews' frequently quoted statement in Palsgraf
v. Long Island R.R.: "It is all a question of expediency ... of fair judgment,
always keeping in mind the fact that we endeavor to make a rule in each case
that will be practical and in keeping with the general understanding of mankind."
Petition of Kinsman Transit Co. v. City of Buffalo, 388 F.2d 821 ( 2d Cir. 1968j.
It may well be that there is no such thing as negligence in the abstract.
"Proof of negligence in the air, so to speak, will not do." In an empty world
negligence would not exist. It does involve a relationship between man and his
fellows, but not merely a relationship between man and those whom he might
reasonably expect his act would injure; rather, a relationship between him and
those whom he does in fact injure, If his act has a tendency to harm someone,
it harms him a mile away as surely as it does those on the scene.
The proposition is this: Every one owes to the world at large the duty of
refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others.
Such an act occurs. Not only is he wronged to whom harm might reasonably
be expected to result, but he also who is in fact injured, even if he be outside
what would generally be thought the danger zone. There needs be duty due the
one complaining, but this is not a duty to a particular individual because as
to him harm might be expected. Harm to some one being the natural result of
the act, not only that one alone, but all those in fact injured may complain.
We have never, I think, held otherwise .... Unreasonable risk being taken, its
consequences are not confined to those who might probably be hurt.
... An overturned lantern may burn all Chicago. We may follow the fire
from the shed to the last building. We rightly say the fire started by the lantern
caused its destruction.
A cause, but not the proximate cause. What we do mean by the word
"proximate" is that, because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense
of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain
point. This is not logic. It is practical politics. Take our rule as to fires. Sparks
from my burning haystack set on fire my house and my neighbor's. I may
recover from a negligent railroad. He may not. Yet the wrongful act as directly
harmed the one as the other. We may regret that the line was drawn just where
it was, but drawn somewhere it had to be. We said the act of the railroad was
not the proximate cause of our neighbor's fire. Cause it surely was. The words
we used were simply indicative of our notions of public policy. Other courts
think differently.
Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
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the boat, for the question of legal cause, proximate cause, or risk within
duty, is always to determine what damage should be attributed to the
defendant, whether it is phrased in terms of the scope of the duty or
foreseeability of the harm. The Roberts court suggests that the Pitre
decision was some type of anomaly necessitated by its facts-that the
foresight-foreseeability approach was better suited for the factual situ-
ation in Pitre. In all the cases cited by Roberts, the court was deciding
legal cause as a matter of law. Roberts seems to indicate that legal
cause should never go to a jury, whereas Pitre properly recognizes that
legal cause is typically a question for the trier of fact except in those
few cases where the evidence is such that reasonable minds could not
differ, and the issue must be decided "as a matter of law," or in the
extraordinary cases where policy concerns may come into play.
The choice of analysis debate implicit in the Roberts and Pitre
opinions is largely academic so long as our appellate courts have ju-
risdiction to review facts found by the jury. The decrees of law as to
wrongful life in Pitre and as to sheriff responsibility in Roberts represent
the deepest acts of conscience by the court commonly labeled as policy
decisions. The socio-economic values of the court manifested in those
decisions would be the same whether exercised in the name of duty-risk
or traditional proximate cause. The choice of analysis scheme thus has
practical consequences only in its controlling the allocation of function
to judge or jury, for the jury's collective layman's conscience has a
different set of socio-economic values than does the policy-oriented
appellate court. Compensation of the injured through expanded tort
liability of risk distributors may be uppermost in the appellate court
conscience, while reasonableness of conduct and responsibility of the
plaintiff for his own injury may guide the jury to its verdict. Unless
the jury can speak with finality in its traditional factual province, there
is no meaningful difference between Pitre and Roberts.
The very serious foregoing question not addressed in Roberts is
when is legal cause a question of law for the court and when is it a
question for the trier of fact? The opinion strongly suggests that it is
always a question of law for the court as a scope-of-duty question. The
trial judge thus remains unguided as to when legal cause should be
decided by the court as a question of law and when it should be submitted
to the jury with instructions on reasonable foreseeability; but it may be
the rule of Roberts that the jury should never get the question at all.
This is all definitively treated in Palsgraf; Cardozo's majority opinion
represents the determination of the scope of duty as a question of law
(more elaborately expounded by Leon Green), and Andrews' dissent
represents the classic application of proximate cause as an issue of fact
for the jury."6
46. The Cardozo duty analysis is by no means the law of the land. See W. Page
19931 023
4LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
The opinion in Roberts illustrates the chief peril of the duty/risk
analysis, that the traditional fact issue of proximate cause will be taken
over entirely by the court under the guise of deciding a question of
duty, which is a question of law. If the Roberts case had been tried
in the federal system, the results undoubtedly would have been quite
different. Under the Seventh Amendment, questions of fact are within
the province of the jury, and a failure to honor that jurisdiction of the
jury results in a breach of the constitutional right of the parties to trial
by jury. The United States Constitution, the jurisprudence and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make it absolutely clear that questions
of fact in a jury trial are the constitutionally protected province of the
jury.4 7
The Seventh Amendment provides that the jury trial, as it existed
at the common law, shall be preserved to the citizens of the country
and facts found by a jury shall not be reviewed by any court. The jury
trial thus guaranteed to the citizens is defined by historic standards,
i.e., the jury trial preserved to us is the one obtaining at common law
between 1791, the date of the adoption of the Seventh Amendment,
and 1938, when the rules of civil procedure for the federal district court,
recognizing right of trial by jury, were adopted . 4 Unquestionably during
that period, proximate cause in negligence cases was a question of fact
for the jury. All authorities agree on this. 49 That leads to the obvious
next question-what is proximate cause?
Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 45, at 319-20 (5th ed. 1984).
It seems evident that in all of these proposed rules and formulae the courts and the
writers have been groping for something that is difficult, if not impossible, to put into
words: some method of limiting liability to those consequences which have some reasonably
close connection with the defendant's conduct and the harm which it originally threatened,
and are in themselves not so remarkable and unusual as to lead one to stop short of
them. It may be questioned whether anyone has yet succeeded in devising terminology
that, as a way of expressing the idea of such a reasonably close connection, will ever
achieve greater acceptance in courtrooms than the despised word "proximate."
47. Charles A. Wright, The Law of Federal Courts § 92, at 609 (4th ed. 1983). "The
Seventh Amendment creates a historical test for trial by jury. The practices of the common
law in 1791, when the amendment was adopted, is made the standard."
48. See id..
49. "And finally it is generally admitted that what is a proximate cause of an injury
is a question of fact, ordinarily to be decided by the jury." William.B. Hale, Handbook
on the Law of Torts § 19, at 46 (1896).
The question of proximate cause is usually for the jury upon all the facts.
Proximate cause is said to be a mixed question of law and fact which must be
submitted to the jury under proper instructions. But where the facts are un-
disputed and the inferences to be drawn from them are plain and not open to
doubt by reasonable men, it is the duty of the court to determine the question
as a matter of law.
I Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts or the Wrongs Which Arise
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To get right to the point, it is submitted that the proximate cause
analysis set forth in Andrews' dissent to Palsgraf is the scheme of
proximate cause cognizable as a question of fact in the common law
jury trial contemplated by the Seventh Amendment and by the consti-
tutional guarantee of civil trial by jury found in the great majority of
the state constitutions. Typically, the state constitutions provide that the
right of civil trial by jury as known at the common law shall remain
inviolate. The right to trial by jury thus governs state procedure as well
as federal procedure as to the proximate cause question-of-law, question-
of-fact problem.
The Leon Green analysis, embodied in Louisiana tort analysis through
the so-called duty/risk scheme, eliminates the traditional proximate cause
question of fact for the jury by phrasing the question as one of scope
of duty, so that the former proximate cause question of fact for the
jury becomes a question of law for the court. Louisiana is the only
state operating its tort analysis with the duty/risk formula. It is submitted
that it is possible to do so in Louisiana, and only in the state court
system of Louisiana, because Louisiana does not have the traditional
constitutional guarantee of civil trial by jury. Indeed, it has no consti-
tutional guarantee of civil trial by jury whatsoever and has full civil
appellate review of fact. This may be the reason the Green analysis has
not been adopted in Texas-where Green is revered in a fashion most
appropriate for such genius-for Texas has a constitutional right to civil
trial by jury in the traditional form. 0 It is immediately apparent that
the duty/risk scheme would not mesh with the constitutional right to
Independently of Contract, 111 (3d ed. 1906).
It is frequently said, in judicial opinions, that the question whether a given
act was the proximate or remote cause of an injury which followed it, is ordinarily
a question for the jury. It is said that "it is not a question of science or
knowledge. It is to be determined as a fact, in view of the circumstances
attending it." It is said to be the province of the jury "to look at the facts
as they transpire, and ascertain whether they are naturally and probably con-
nected, in orderly sequence with the prime cause, or disconnected by some
intervening agency affecting its operation.
I Seymour D. Thompson, Commentaries on the Law of Negligence § 161, at 157 (1901).
"It was only in the 1840s, when a more coherent idea of a substantive law of
negligent torts had developed, that proximate cause became firmly established as an element
in negligence law." Patrick J. Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law, 69 Wash. U.
L.Q. 49, 68 (1991).
50. Tex. Const. art. 5, § 10:
Sec. 10. In the trial of all causes in the District Courts, the plaintiff or
defendant shall, upon application made in open court, have the right of trial
by jury; but no jury shall be empaneled in any civil case unless demanded by
a party to the case, and a jury fee be paid by the party demanding a jury,
for such sum, and with such exceptions as may be prescribed by the Legislature.
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have the jury decide questions of fact in the form of proximate cause
questions. So it is only in Louisiana and in the Cardozo opinion in
Palsgraf that the duty/risk concept exists, in which the scope-of-duty
as question-of-law phrase is used to decide the traditional proximate
cause-issue of fact question.
How would Roberts have been tried in the federal system? Without
dispute, the district judge would have ruled that the sheriff's office has
a duty to use appropriate care in commissioning deputies. Whether the
sheriff's office used the proper care in commissioning the cook would
have been a question of fact for the jury (the determination of the issue
of negligence), because it was clearly a set of facts on which reasonable
minds could differ. As to cause in fact and legal or proximate cause,
typically, the federal judges combine them in a single instruction;5 but
it might serve our purposes better here to separate the two questions.
In Roberts, there is obviously a genuine issue of fact on whether the
commissioning of the cook as a deputy was a "but for" cause-in-fact
of plaintiff's injury. (A jury would have been on sound grounds in
finding no causation because history shows that even the most highly
qualified occasionally misbehave with their firearms.) So it was a question
of fact for the jury to determine causation. Knowingly separating the
legal or proximate cause issue, if the jury found that the commissioning
of the cook was negligent and was the cause in fact of the plaintiff's
injury, it is again beyond dispute that in ninety-nine percent of the
courts in this country, the question of proximate cause would have been
put to the jury as a question of fact. There would have been instructions
on intervening cause, superseding cause, remote and tenuous causation,
departure from official duties on a personal lark, and other suggested
instructions to inform the jury on the nuances of this particular fact
issue, but make no mistake, proximate cause properly would have been
put to the jury as a question of fact. What would the jury have returned?
The jury in Roberts itself returned a finding of liability, so it can be
speculated that a jury in the federal system might have found the same.
The foregoing scenario illustrates the huge difference between our
state system and the federal system with its constitutional guarantee of
51. Proximate cause instruction-the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the act or failure to act by the defendant was a cause in fact of the damage
plaintiff suffered. An act or a failure to act is a cause in fact of an injury or damages
if it appears from the evidence that the act or omission played a substantial part in
bringing about or actually causing the injury or damages. The plaintiff must also prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the act or failure to act by the defendant was
a proximate cause of the damage plaintiff suffered. An act or omission is a proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injuries or damages if it appears from the evidence that the injury
or damage was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the act or omission. Bench book
of local judge in Federal District Court, Middle District of Louisiana.
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civil trial by jury, proximate cause as a question of fact, with no
jurisdiction of facts by the appellate court. In a Roberts federal trial
there would have been sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings
on each of the key issues, and it would have been absolutely futile to
appeal the case to the Fifth Circuit because it would have found that
the jury had simply done its duty.
Because Roberts was tried in the state court, the plaintiff was
subjected to a double whammy, the analysis through duty/risk scope-
of-duty question of law for the court and, perhaps even more devastating,
the lack of constitutional guarantee of civil jury trial. The parties also
face the appellate review of fact which in this case reversed the jury
on a question that in every other state in the union and in the federal
system would have been a question of fact on which the jury's verdict
was binding.
There are numerous cases in the federal system and in the various
states pointing out that proximate cause is an issue of fact for the jury
and failure to honor the factual jurisdiction of the jury deprives a party
of its constitutional right to civil trial by jury. 2 It is thus only in
52. In our present case the conclusion is inescapable that the court, in granting
a new trial as to damages only, has substituted its finding that Rosenthal's
negligence was a proximate cause of the injury for the special verdict of the
jury finding that Rosenthal's negligence was not a proximate cause of plaintiff's
injury. The court by its order has in effect determined that Mound and Rosenthal
are both liable to the plaintiff for his injuries. In so doing, the court acted
beyond its jurisdiction. In our present case, a jury trial was properly requested
and granted upon all the issues and all issues were submitted to the jury by
special verdicts, as authorized by rule 49(a). The parties were entitled to have
all issues tried by the jury as a matter of right. Rules 38, 39. Such rules preserve
the right to jury trial, guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment, which reads:
"In Suits at common law where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a
jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of common law." The amendment is plain and unam-
biguous and speaks for itself. The only manner in which facts tried by a jury
may be re-examined as a question of law is limited to situations where a motion
for directed verdict upon the issue is made at the close of all the evidence and
a motion for judgment n.o.v. has been made as authorized by Rule 50(b).
Tsai v. Rosenthal, 297 F.2d 614, 617-18 (8th Cir. 1961) (citations omitted).
Likewise, whether Chicago Bridge's breach of its duty of care to Keene was
the proximate cause of Keene's injuries was an issue of fact for the jury to
decide. The jury permissibly could find it was reasonably foreseeable that a
Ceilcote employee would undertake to move Chicago Bridge's sand pot from
the scaffolding boards and was in danger of being injured in doing so without
the assistance of Chicago Bridge employees or special equipment such as the
cherrypicker used by Chicago Bridge to lift the sand pot on top of Ceilcote's
scaffolding boards in the first place. Whether the risk of injury from negligent
conduct is reasonably foreseeable and proximately caused by such negligent
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Louisiana that the adversaries in tort litigation can experience this double
whammy.
In a state with a constitutional right to civil trial by jury and with
the historic jurisdiction of the jury over questions of fact as they obtained
in jury trials at the common law, it is submitted that Andrews' proximate
cause scheme in his dissent to Palsgraf (closely followed in Pitre) is the
only intellectually sound analysis for a workable allocation of functions
among the judge and the jury, at the same time honoring the consti-
tutionally required allocation of fact to the jury. Andrews' statement
was of the very traditional scheme, that if the defendant violated the
general duty of care governing his endeavor, and his breach of care
caused harm to various defendants, it would be a factual question for
the jury as to which of those harms were proximately caused by his
breach. Of course, the court stands as guardian of the jury process and
any issue of fact can be so clear because of the evidence that reasonable
minds could not differ on the questions, so that the question of fact
may be decided as a matter of law. It is a simple system and has stood
the test of time beautifully. It is the system to which Justice Dennis
wants us to return. We should make the return trip to traditional
proximate cause, carrying with us the constitutional right to civil trial
by jury in Louisiana, giving to the jury verdict on matters fairly within
its province the full dignity guaranteed by the Constitution of the United
States and guaranteed by the constitutions of the other states to all
their citizens.
conduct is ordinarily a question for the jury. The record in this case contains
competent evidence to prove that it was foreseeable that placing a loaded sand
pot on top of another subcontractor's material was dangerous and could result
in injury to that subcontractor's employees.
Keene v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 596 So. 2d 700, 705 (Fla. App. 1st Dist. 1992)
(citations omitted, emphasis added).
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